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Abstract
The ability to fool modern CNN classifiers with
tiny perturbations of the input has lead to the
development of a large number of candidate de-
fenses and often conflicting explanations. In this
paper, we argue for examining adversarial exam-
ples from the perspective of Bayes-Optimal clas-
sification. We construct realistic image datasets
for which the Bayes-Optimal classifier can be ef-
ficiently computed and derive analytic conditions
on the distributions so that the optimal classifier
is either robust or vulnerable. By training dif-
ferent classifiers on these datasets, for which the
“gold standard” optimal classifiers are known, we
can disentangle the possible sources of vulnera-
bility and avoid the accuracy-robustness tradeoff
that may occur in commonly used datasets. Our
results show that even when the optimal classi-
fier is robust, standard CNN training consistently
learns a vulnerable classifier. At the same time,
for exactly the same training data, RBF SVMs
consistently learn a robust classifier. The same
trend is observed in experiments with real images.
1. Introduction
Perhaps the most intriguing property of modern machine
learning methods is their susceptibility to adversarial ex-
amples (Szegedy et al., 2014): for many powerful classi-
fiers it is possible to perturb the input by an imperceptible
amount and change the decision of the classifier. While
adversarial examples were most famously reported for CNN
classifiers (Szegedy et al., 2014), subsequent research has
shown that other classifiers can also fall prey to similar at-
tacks (Goodfellow et al., 2018). Attempts to make classifiers
robust to these attacks have generated a tremendous amount
of interest (e.g. (Schott et al., 2019) and references within).
As a first step towards solving the problem, many authors
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have attempted to understand the source of the failure (Good-
fellow et al., 2018; Szegedy et al., 2014; Tanay & Griffin,
2016; Fawzi et al., 2018). Broadly speaking, existing ex-
planations fall into two groups (see section 4 for a more
detailed discussion of related work). One approach argues
that adversarial vulnerability is in some sense inevitable:
either due to the geometry of high dimensions (e.g. (Good-
fellow et al., 2018; 2015; Shamir et al., 2019)) or due to
fundamental limitations on robustness of classifiers trained
from finite data (Schmidt et al., 2018). Another approach
views adversarial vulnerability as a ”bug” of CNNs and
current training methods, which can be avoided by other
architectures or training protocols (e.g. (Tanay & Griffin,
2016; Nakkiran, 2019; Lyu & Li, 2020; Schott et al., 2019)).
One reason for the existence of many conflicting explana-
tions may be the difficulty of analyzing adversarial vulner-
ability in a realistic yet tractable setting. In this paper, we
provide such a setting. We construct realistic image datasets
for which the Bayes-Optimal classifier can be efficiently
computed and analyze the vulnerability of the optimal clas-
sifier. We derive analytic conditions on the distributions
where even the optimal classifier will be vulnerable and
other conditions where the optimal classifier will be prov-
ably robust. Figure 1a-c shows an example: synthetic face
images from the class ”male” or ”female”. In the first,
”asymmetric” distribution, the Bayes-Optimal classifier is
vulnerable and an imperceptible perturbation is sufficient
to change a ”male” face to one that would be classified as
”female” (figure 1b). In the second, ”symmetric” dataset,
fooling the optimal classifier requires making large, percep-
tually meaningful changes (figure 1c).
By training different classifiers on these datasets, we can
disentangle the possible sources of vulnerability and avoid
the accuracy-robustness tradeoff that may occur in com-
monly used datasets. Our results show that even when the
optimal classifier is robust, standard CNN training consis-
tently learns a vulnerable classifier (e.g. figure 1d). At the
same time, for exactly the same training data, RBF SVMs
consistently learn a robust classifier (figure 1e). Our results
suggest that in many realistic settings, adversarial vulner-
ability is not an unavoidable property of learning in high
dimensions but rather a direct result of suboptimal training
methods used in current practice.
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Figure 1. We present realistic image datasets for which the Bayes-Optimal classifier can be calculated efficiently and derive analytic
conditions on when the optimal classifier will be robust or vulnerable to adversarial examples. When the data distribution satisfies certain
asymmetries, the Bayes-Optimal classifier is vulnerable (b), but when the distribution is symmetric, the optimal classifier is robust and
adversarial attacks are perceptually meaningful (c). Our experiments with these datasets show that CNN training consistently fails to find
a robust classifier even when the optimal classifier is robust (d), while large-margin methods often succeed (e).
2. A Realistic Tractable Setting for Analysing
Adversarial Vulnerability
We focus on a two class classification problem and denote
by p1(x), p2(x) the distribution of the two classes. We
assume that p1(x), p2(x) are known and that the two classes
have equal priors, so the Bayes-Optimal classifier simply
classifies x as belonging to class 1 if p1(x) > p2(x) and to
class 2 otherwise. It is well known that this classification
rule is optimal and no other classification rule can achieve
higher accuracy (assuming of course that p1(x), p2(x) are
correct) (Duda et al., 1973). Several recent papers (Schmidt
et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2019) have analyzed adversarial
examples in this setting, but only when p1(x), p2(x) are
both Gaussians with the same covariance, so that the optimal
classifier is linear. Real image classification problems are
of course very different from this simplified setting.
In our approach, we assume that images that belong to a
single class form a nonlinear, low-dimensional manifold in
pixel space. A standard way to model such manifolds is to
use a mixture of Factor Analyzers (MFA) model (Ghahra-
mani et al., 1996). The model is based on the observation
that locally the manifold can be represented by a Gaussian
whose covariance matrix is a sum of a low-rank matrix (rep-
resenting the covariance on the manifold) and a diagonal
matrix (representing the covariance off the manifold, e.g.
due to sensor noise). Figure 2 (left) shows an example
of a nonlinear 2D manifold in three dimensions, and its
representation using an MFA model.
To create synthetic image datasets for classification, we start
with a labeled training set with two classes. We then train
separate MFA models p1(x), p2(x) on images from the two
classes using the algorithm (and code) from (Richardson &
Weiss, 2018). We now create a new training set by sampling
images from the two models, and similarly a new test set.
Since these datasets were created by sampling from a known
model, we can calculate the Bayes-Optimal classifier. At
the same time, the images are realistic and MFA models
have been shown to capture much of the variability of the
images in the original data (Richardson & Weiss, 2018).
We created 12 such datasets of faces (based on the CelebA
dataset (Liu et al., 2015)) and 3 datasets of digits (based on
MNIST)1. Figure 2 (right) shows samples from five such
datasets that correspond to five binary classification prob-
lems: Male vs. Female, Smiling vs. Not-smiling, Eyeglasses
vs. No-eyeglasses, 0 vs. 6, and 2 vs. 7. While these sam-
ples are typically somewhat blurred, it can be seen they are
realistic and highly variable. In fact, in many real world
applications one needs to classify somewhat blurry images
(e.g. analyzing faces in surveillance videos). We again
emphasize that for all of these datasets, we can efficiently
calculate the Bayes-Optimal classifier. Intuitively, it would
seem that this optimal classifier will always be robust. We
now show that this intuition is false.
2.1. Provably robust or vulnerable optimal classifiers
A textbook example of Bayes-Optimal classification is when
both classes are generated using Gaussians with the same
spherical covariance, in which case the optimal classifier is
a linear discriminant that is orthogonal to the difference be-
tween the two means (figure 3a). In this case, if the distance
between the two means is large relative to the covariance,
then almost all points are far from the decision boundary and
so an adversarial attack which only makes small changes to
the input will typically fail. But as shown in the bottom of
figure 3 there are other examples where the decision bound-
ary is close to many of the datapoints and an adversarial
attack which only makes small changes to the input will
often succeed. What distinguishes these two cases?
1The datasets and models will be made publicly available after
publication.
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Figure 2. Left: A Mixture of Factor Analyzers (MFA) model for toy data in R3 (sampled 3D helical surface – blue points). Each
component is a Gaussian on a learned 2-dimensional hyperplane with added axis-aligned noise. Right: Samples from our realistic datasets.
As we prove below, the distinction is based on the presence
of asymmetries in the discriminative power of different fea-
tures. To gain intuition, consider a classifier that attempts
to recognize images of a person who has a small mole on
their face. Denote by p1(x) the probability of generating
an image of this person. Denote by p2(x) the probability
of generating an image of a different person. Under p1(x)
all images have a mole, while under p2(x) this probability
is very low. Thus an optimal classifier will assign an ex-
tremely high weight to the presence of a mole in an image.
This means that by making a tiny change in the image and
erasing the mole, we can drastically change the output of
the optimal classifier (and in fact drive p1(x) down to zero).
Note that this is not the same as the standard definition of
overfitting (i.e. a difference between performance on the
training samples and test samples): even unseen images of
the person that are generated from p1(x) will have a mole
present, so giving this feature high weight will not hurt
generalization, but will make the classifier susceptible to
adversarial attacks. We now make this intuition precise.
We first focus on the case where both class distributions are
Gaussians, i.e. p1(x), p2(x) are both Gaussian with means
µ1, µ2 and covariances Σ1,Σ2.
Lemma 1: Asymmetric case. Let d be a direction of min-
imal variance under Σ1: d = arg min d′TΣ1d′. Let σ21 be
the variance projecting x onto that direction when x comes
from class 1. If σ1 → 0 and Σ2 is full rank then almost any
point in class 1 is arbitrarily close to the optimal decision
surface.
Proof: We denote by σ2 = dTΣ2d the variance of the data
in direction d under the distribution of the second class
p2. Note that by the assumption that Σ2 is full rank, this
variance must be nonzero. We write the vector x as (t, s)
where t is the projection in direction d and s is a vector of
projections in directions orthogonal to d. We denote by ti
the projection of µi in direction d. The decision surface as
a function of t is a solution to:(
1
σ21
− 1
σ22
)
t2 + 2
(
t2
σ22
− t1
σ21
)
t+
(
t21
σ21
− t
2
2
σ22
+ log
σ21
σ22
)
(1)
= log p2(s|t)− log p1(s|t)
Now since d is a direction of minimal variance, it must be
an eigenvector of Σ1 so that s and t are independent under
p1 and we can write log p1(s|t) = log p1(s). Using the
standard equation for conditional Gaussians, p2(s|t) will
also be a Gaussian with the following mean and covariance:
µs|t = µs + Σst2 (t− t2) (2)
Σs|t = Σss2 − Σst2
1
σ22
Σts2 (3)
where Σss2 ,Σ
st
2 are the appropriate submatrices of the co-
variance matrix Σ2. As σ1 → 0 then t→ t1 and µs|t, Σs|t
will not depend on t. This means that the right-hand side of
equation 1 depends only on s and not on t or σ1.
As σ1σ2 approaches zero, the solutions of this equation ap-
proach t1. And because σ1 → 0, almost all samples from
the first Gaussian will be close to t1, so moving x by a tiny
amount in direction d will change the optimal decision. 
Lemma 1 shows that when there are strong asymmetries
in the covariances of the two classes, the optimal classifier
will be provably vulnerable. The following two lemmas, on
the other hand, show settings when the minimal variances
in each class are similar and the optimal classifier will be
provably robust.
Lemma 2: Symmetric isotropic. Assume Σ1 = Σ2 = σI
and σ → 0, then with high probability all points in both
classes are at distance d/2 from the decision boundary.
Proof: For spherical and equal covariances, the Bayes-
Optimal classifier simply projects the data onto the direction
µ1 − µ2 and classifies a point based on whether that projec-
tion is closer to the projection of µ1 or the projection of µ2.
This means that the problem reduces to a scalar problem,
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Figure 3. Top: examples of 2D distribution where the optimal decision boundary is far from the datapoints. Bottom: distribution where
the optimal boundary is close to many of the datapoints.
with two distributions whose means are at distance d and
have scalar variance σ2. With high probability, under the
assumption, all the points are close to one of the means, so
they are at distance d/2 from the decision boundary. 
Lemma 3: Symmetric low-rank + diagonal. Suppose both
classes have a covariance that is a sum of a low-rank ma-
trix plus a diagonal matrix Σi = AiATi + σ
2I and A1, A2
have the same singular values and σ is the same for both
classes. Let d be the minimal distance between the two
linear subspaces2
d = min
z1,z2
‖µ1 +A1z1 − (µ2 +A2z2)‖
As σ → 0 then almost all points are at distance d/2 from
the Bayes-Optimal decision boundary.
Proof: It can be shown (see appendix A.1) that when σ → 0,
the optimal classifier classifies a point x based on the Eu-
clidean distance between x and the linear subspace defined
by µi + Aiz. Because σ is the same, each point will be
classified to the closest subspace. Now, as σ → 0 almost
any point x from class 1 will have distance close to 0 to the
first linear subspace and distance of at least d to the second
subspace. If we perturb x by a vector δ then the distance
to each subspace can change by no more than ‖δ‖. This
means that if ‖δ‖ < d/2, the distance to the first subspace
will remain smaller than the distance to the second subspace,
and hence the Bayes-Optimal classifier will not be fooled
by any perturbation whose norm is less than d/2. 
Figures 3a,b,e,f illustrate the dependence of classifier ro-
bustness on the symmetry or asymmetry of the variances:
2Two low-dimensional subspaces in high dimensions will al-
most always not intersect.
When the minimal variances in both Gaussians is similar
then the decision boundary is far from most points (top), but
when there is a strong asymmetry in the minimal variances
then the decision boundary becomes close to the datapoints
in one of the classes.
Mixture Models. We now assume that the distribution
in each class can be represented as a Gaussian Mixture
Model and denote by pik the kth Gaussian in class i and
by piik its prior probability. We also assume that within
each class, the components are well separated, i.e. that
for each datapoint the assignment probabilities put all their
mass on one of the components. More formally, denote
by gik(x) =
piikpik(x)∑
j piijpij(x)
the assignment probability of a
datapoint x to component k, then we assume that for each x,
gik(x) = δ(k−k∗i (x)) where k∗i (x) is the index of the com-
ponent that is most likely to have generated x under probabil-
ity pi(x). Under this assumption, the probability of generat-
ing a point x under p1 is simply p1(x) = pik∗1 (x)p1k∗1 (x)(x).
We will also assume that within each distribution, the as-
signed component does not change when we perturb x by a
perturbation δ smaller than d/2: k∗i (x) = k
∗
i (x+ δ).
Theorem 1: Assume that both classes are generated by
well separated Gaussian mixtures with uniform priors on the
components. If for every Gaussian there exists a Gaussian in
the other class so that they satisfy the asymmetry conditions
of Lemma 1, then almost any point will be arbitrarily close
to the optimal decision boundary. On the other hand, if all
Gaussians in the two classes satisfy the symmetry conditions
of Lemma 2 or Lemma 3, then the optimal classifier is robust
to any perturbation smaller than d/2.
Proof: By the well separatedness assumption, the optimal
classifier simply compares the likelihood of a point x under
A Bayes-Optimal View on Adversarial Examples
the most likely Gaussian component in each class. This
means we can directly apply the appropriate Lemma, where
p1, p2 are the most likely Gaussian component in each class.

Figures 3d,h illustrate the effect of asymmetry in a mixture
model. Note that the assumption of uniform priors is only
to simplify the proof. When the priors are non-uniform, the
optimal decision boundary shifts by the logarithm of the
ratio of the two component priors. Similarly, the vulnera-
bility condition holds when there is a strong asymmetry in
the variances, even if the minimal variance is not close to 0.
Similar results can be obtained for non-Gaussian distribu-
tions (figure 3c,g and appendix A.2).
Symmetric and asymmetric datasets. To summarize our
analysis, the Bayes-Optimal classifier will be provably ro-
bust when the covariances satisfy symmetry conditions and
provably vulnerable when there are strong asymmetries. We
therefore created symmetric and asymmetric variants of the
MFA datasets. In the symmetric version, we regularized the
MFA so that the ”off manifold” variance σ is small and the
same in all components and the distribution approximates
the conditions of Lemma 3. In the asymmetric version, we
added to each MFA model one “outlier” component with
a diagonal covariance with much larger σ than all other
covariances and a mean that is close to the global data mean.
This version approximates the conditions of Lemma 1.
The advantage of using a MFA model over other genera-
tive models such as VAEs or GANs (Kingma & Welling,
2014; Gulrajani et al., 2017) is that the log likelihood of
any image can be calculated efficiently. Since the data were
generated by the assumed distributions, this classifier is
Bayes-Optimal. Indeed in all datasets we created, the accu-
racy of the classifier was close to 100%. We now asked: is
this Bayes-Optimal classifier robust to adversarial attacks?
Evaluating the robustness. Unlike our theoretical results,
deciding whether or not a real classifier is robust or not re-
quires an operational definition of what constitutes a ”tiny”
or ”imperceptible” perturbation. We follow the standard
practice of calculating the mean perturbation `2 norms of an
adversarial attack (Schott et al., 2019; Carlini et al., 2019).
We allow the adversary an unlimited budget in attacking
the classifiers, and measure how large a perturbation was
required to cross the decision boundary. The mean is calcu-
lated only over successful attacks, when the original sample
was correctly classified and the adversarial example was not.
Since this definition is sensitive to outliers and the particular
choice of Euclidean norm, we also examined the histograms
of changes made to each pixel in the adversarial attack.
Finally, we visually inspected the adversarial images.
In all 15 datasets, we found that these three methods of
defining robustness are consistent. For the face images,
when the mean `2 is less than 1.5, then the adversarial im-
ages are almost indistinguishable from the original images,
and the vast majority of the pixels in the adversarial images
are within 5/255 intensity levels from their original value.
On the other hand, when the mean `2 is around 3, then the
adversarial images are perceptually quite different from the
original ones, and many pixels differ by more than 5/255
from their original values. We used a simple gradient attack
that takes small steps in the direction of the gradient of the
MFA log likelihood (details in appendix C.2). Similar re-
sults are achieved with a standard implementation (Papernot
et al., 2016) of the CW-L2 attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
As shown in figures 4 (similar to figure 1b,c), the difference
between the symmetric datasets and asymmetric datasets
is dramatic (see appendix D.2 for similar results on other
classes). When there exists a large asymmetry between the
minimal variances of different Gaussians, the conditions of
Lemma 1 hold, and a tiny imperceptible change is sufficient
to fool the Bayes-Optimal classifier. However, when all
Gaussians have the same minimal variance, the conditions
of Lemma 3 hold and any adversary will need to make
much larger changes and the adversarial examples become
perceptually meaningful.
3. Experiments: Why are CNNs so brittle?
Given our analysis, the fact that modern machine learning
methods are often susceptible to tiny adversarial perturba-
tions may be due to two very different reasons (figure 5).
One reason could be that the data distribution is asymmetric,
so that the Bayes-Optimal classifier is not robust, and hence
it is not surprising that a CNN is also not robust. A second
possible reason is illustrated in figure 5b: here the data dis-
tribution is symmetric and the Bayes-Optimal classifier is
robust, yet SGD starting from a bad initial condition finds
a brittle classifier. If this is the case, then the brittleness is
not due to the data distribution but rather a failure of the
learning method.
In order to separate the contribution of the dataset from the
estimation method in the vulnerability of machine learning
methods, we trained a CNN on samples from all 15 ”sym-
metric” datasets described in section 2.1, and measured the
vulnerability of the learned CNN. We used the CNN im-
plementation and the CW-L2 attack from the CleverHans
library (see appendix B.3,C.1). We asked: will the CNN find
a brittle classifier even though the optimal one is robust?
Results are shown in figures 6 and 7. In all 15 cases, the
CNN found a high accuracy classifier that was vulnerable
to small adversarial perturbations, even though the opti-
mal classifier is robust. The difference is most dramatic
in the CelebA tasks, where the CNN adversarial examples
are almost indistinguishable from the original images (ex-
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Male/Female Asymmetric: (L2 = 0.9)
0 25 50 75 100 125
Male/Female Symmetric: (L2 = 3.3)
0 25 50 75 100 125
Figure 4. The vulnerability of the optimal classifier depends on the presence of asymmetries. Each result shows the original images,
adversarial images and perturbations (magnified for visibility as necessary). Histogram of the perturbations in pixel values are on the right.
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Figure 5. Why are CNNs so brittle? Is it because the data distri-
butions are asymmetric so that the optimal classifier is also brittle
(left) or is due to non optimal learning in cases where the optimal
classifier is robust (right)?
amples of the attacks on different datasets are shown in
appendix D.3).
While there are many possible architectures and optimiza-
tion methods for CNNs, we did not find any improvement in
the CNN robustness in our attempts to change the number
of filters, layers, training iterations etc (Figure 8). In partic-
ular, (Schmidt et al., 2018) have argued that one needs more
training examples to achieve robust classification, so we
systematically varied the amount of training images (gen-
erated dynamically at each SGD iteration), and found no
significant improvement in robustness as we increased the
number of training examples up to 1 million examples.
Is it possible to learn a robust classifier for these datasets
from finite training data? To answer that question, we then
trained linear and RBF support vector machine classifiers on
exactly the same datasets. The linear SVM attempts to max-
imize the margin while maintaining high accuracy, but since
the optimal classifier is nonlinear it ends up learning a brittle
classifier. More importantly, with an appropriate bandwidth
parameter RBF SVMs find robust classifiers when trained
on exactly the same data (when the bandwidth parameter is
too large, the RBF performs similarly to a linear SVM).
The robustness of CNNs can be improved using adversarial
training, in which adversarial samples (of some selected
attack) are injected during training. We experimented with
the SOTA method of (Zhang et al., 2019) and found that,
depending on the hyperparameters used, it can find a ro-
bust classifier, although at the expense of lowered accuracy
(figure 8 right).
Returning to figure 5, our results strongly support the hy-
pothesis that for these cases brittleness is due to suboptimal
learning methods, even when the data distributions are sym-
metric and the optimal classifier is robust.
Training and testing on real data. One can ask, to what
extent our analysis and experiments represent adversarial
attacks on models trained on real data? To answer this
question we trained CNNs and SVMs on five real CelebA
attribute datasets, and indeed, as shown in Figure 9 and
appendix D.4, the results are similar to the synthetic sym-
metric datasets – CNN and Linear SVM are vulnerable
while RBF SVM is robust and can only be fooled when the
perturbations are perceptually meaningful.
Note that unlike our proposed symmetric data, in which the
“gold standard” optimal classifier is both robust and accu-
rate, on real data, which may contain variance asymmetries,
different models might reach different trade-off points be-
tween accuracy and robustness. In particular, it is known
that RBF SVM accuracy is highly influenced by the hyper-
parameters C, γ and we performed only a minimal search to
obtain these results. In future work, it would be interesting
to explore the full regularization path as in (Hastie et al.,
2004).
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Figure 6. Adversarial attack perturbation sizes (mean L2 norm) for different models for all symmetric datasets.
Original:
Optimal: 0 16 32 48 64
3.14
CNN: 0 16 32 48 64
0.86
Lin. SVM: 0 16 32 48 64
0.58
RBF SVM: 0 16 32 48 64
2.23
Figure 7. Adversarial examples, perturbations and histograms
(with mean L2 value) for CelebA attribute ’Smiling’.
4. Related Work
One of the first explanations of adversarial examples in
CNNs was that the decision surface learned by neural net-
works is “discontinuous to a significant extent”, analogous
to an attempt to discriminate the rational numbers from the
rest of the real numbers (Szegedy et al., 2014). However as
shown by our analysis, when there are strong asymmetries
in the variances of the two classes, adversarial examples can
fool the optimal classifier even when the decision boundary
is smooth and continuous.
A second prominent theory suggests that the problem is
that neural network classifiers are “unreasonably linear”
combined with the fact that they operate in high dimen-
sions (Goodfellow et al., 2015; 2018). In high dimensions
the output of a random linear classifier can be changed
by making a small change in the `∞ norm of an example.
(Fawzi et al., 2018) show a connection between the error
rate of linear and quadratic classifiers and the adversarial
vulnerability and show that linear classifiers in high dimen-
sions must be vulnerable for data that is not linearly separa-
ble. (Ford et al., 2019) show that adversarial vulnerability
is closely related to the lack of generalization to random
perturbations and that in high dimensions even moderate
failures to generalize to high amounts of noise imply the ex-
istence of adversarial examples. (Shamir et al., 2019) have
also focused on the geometry of high dimensions arguing
that adversarial attacks may be a “natural consequence of
the geometry of Rn with the L0 (Hamming) metric”.
Both our analysis and our experiments suggest that high
dimensionality is neither necessary nor sufficient for vul-
nerability. When strong asymmetries exist, even two di-
mensional datasets can be constructed such that the optimal
classifier is vulnerable. At the same time, when there are no
asymmetries, the optimal classifier is robust, even in very
high dimensions. The same is true for “excessively linear”
classifiers: the RBF SVM is probably no less linear than a
CNN, yet it is robust in our symmetric and in real datasets.
The accuracy-robustness tradefoff has also been suggested
as an explanation for adversarial vulnerability (Zhang et al.,
2019). (Schmidt et al., 2018) present a model under which
adversarially robust generalization requires more data. As
our analysis shows, for symmetric datasets there is no trade-
off between accuracy and robustness and the optimal clas-
sifier in terms of accuracy is also robust. Our experiments
also show that with proper regularization (i.e. a RBF SVM),
one can learn adversarially robust classifiers with the same
amount of data for which CNNs learn a vulnerable classifier.
Most recently, (Ilyas et al., 2019) have argued that adversar-
ial examples are a feature, not a bug, and showed that one
can in fact obtain information about the true decision bound-
ary from adversarial examples. Their analysis suggests that
vulnerability results from the presence of predictive fea-
tures that are not robust. They presented a synthetic dataset
which was constructed to not contain such features, and
showed that CNN training on that dataset was robust. Our
analysis in terms of symmetric vs. asymmetric datasets is
similar to theirs but more general (they only considered
linear classifiers). Our experimental results, however, are
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Figure 8. First three graphs: Wider and deeper CNNs and longer training with more data does not improve the robustness (optimal
classifiers are shown as dashed lines for reference). Right: Accuracy/robustness tradeoff (means over the different datasets) in adversarially-
trained CNNs ((Zhang et al., 2019) β values) vs. models that are both accurate and robust – the Bayes-optimal and RBF SVM.
Original:
CNN:
Lin. SVM:
RBF SVM:
CNN Linear SVM RBF SVM
0
1
2
3
4
Male
Smiling
Bangs
Heavy_Makeup
Eyeglasses
Figure 9. Adversarial examples for class Male/Female (left) and
mean perturbation sizes (right) for different models trained on real
CelebA images – results are consistent with our other experiments.
quite different and suggest that in more challenging settings,
CNNs consistently learn vulnerable classifiers even when
the asymmetries do not exist in the data distributions.
In (Nakkiran, 2019), a synthetic dataset was presented with-
out nonrobust features, but CNN training led to vulnerable
classifiers when the dataset was noisy. This result is consis-
tent with (Tanay & Griffin, 2016) who show that adversarial
vulnerability is related to overfitting in learning algorithms
that are not sufficiently regularized. Similarly, (Lyu & Li,
2020) show theoretically and experimentally that the details
of the training procedure can significantly change the robust-
ness of CNNs. Our experimental results also highlight the
need for regularization in more realistic and challenging set-
tings (including real data), while our analysis points out that
lack of robustness may also occur with no overfitting when
the data is asymmetric. Our experiments also show that reg-
ularization is not sufficient: the linear SVM also attempts
to maximize the margin, but due to its limited expressive
power it still ends up learning a vulnerable classifier.
Intuitively, we might expect classifiers based on generative
models (e.g. ”analysis by synthesis” (Schott et al., 2019))
to be more robust to adversarial attacks, since they model
all the data, not just the discriminative features. But our
analysis shows that even when such a classifier is based on
the true generative model, it can be arbitrarily vulnerable,
when the two distributions show strong asymmetries.
5. Discussion
Since the discovery of adversarial examples for CNNs there
has been much discussion whether they are a ”bug” that is
specific to neural networks or a ”feature” of high dimen-
sional geometry. On the one hand, our results show that
even the Bayes-Optimal classifier may be susceptible to tiny
adversarial perturbations, and this can happen in low dimen-
sions and when the optimal classification function is smooth.
Perhaps more significantly, our analysis has also enabled us
to construct realistic datasets for which the Bayes-Optimal
classifier is provably robust. We find that standard CNN
training consistently fails to find a robust classifier for these
datasets, while large-margin methods can succeed when
training on exactly the same data. This suggests that in
some situations, the presence of adversarial examples rep-
resents a failure of current, suboptimal learning methods,
rather than being an unavoidable property of learning in
high dimensions.
We are by no means advocating a return to using RBF SVMs.
Rather, we believe that explicit regularization methods for
CNNs may enable learning robust classifiers while main-
taining the power of deep architectures. Recent theoretical
work on gradient descent methods suggests that they im-
plicitly reward large margin classifiers in both shallow and
deep architectures (Soudry et al., 2018; Poggio et al., 2017;
Lyu & Li, 2020) although convergence to a large margin
classifier may require exponential time.
In general, when trying to understand a complex effect, it is
often useful to disentangle the different causes. The Bayes-
Optimal perspective on adversarial examples identifies two
possible causes: asymmetries in the datasets and suboptimal
learning. Furthermore, it allows us to create tractable and
realistic datasets in which one of the two causes can be
clearly implicated. We are optimistic that this approach will
be of great use in developing new learning algorithms that
are practical and robust.
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A. Additional Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3: Symmetric low-rank + diagonal. Suppose both classes have a covariance that is a sum of a low-rank matrix
plus a diagonal matrix Σi = AiATi + σ
2I and A1, A2 have the same singular values and σ is the same for both classes. Let
d be the minimal distance between the two linear subspaces3
d = min
z1,z2
‖µ1 +A1z1 − (µ2 +A2z2)‖
As σ → 0 then almost all points are at distance d/2 from the Bayes-Optimal decision boundary.
Proof: If x ∼ N(µ,AAT + σ2I) then the distribution of x can be described by the following generative model:
z ∼ N(0, I) (4)
η ∼ N(0, σ2I) (5)
x = Az + µ+ η (6)
We can also write the likelihood of x as:
P (x) =
∫
z
P (x, z)dz (7)
Since x, z are jointly Gaussian, P (x, z) is an unnormalized Gaussian function of x and the integral is given by the height of
the unnormalized Gaussian divided by the square root of the determinant of the second derivative of logP (x, z) with respect
to z (see for example (MacKay & Mac Kay, 2003) p. 341). So we can write:
logP (x) = −min
z
1
2σ2
‖µ+Az − x‖2 − 1
2
zT z − 1
2
log det(I +
1
σ2
ATA) +
N
2
log(2pi)
Since A1, A2 are assumed to have the same singular values, the log determinant term in the log likelihood is the same for
both classes so the Bayes-Optimal classifier will classify a point as belonging to class 1 if:
−min
z
1
2σ2
‖µ1 +A1z − x‖2 − 1
2
zT z > −min
z
1
2σ2
‖µ2 +A2z − x‖2 − 1
2
zT z
As σ → 0 the Bayes-Optimal decision rule will simply be:
min
z
‖µ1 +A1z − x‖2 < min
z
‖µ2 +A2z − x‖2
so that a point is classified based on which subspace it is closer to.
Now, as σ → 0 almost any point x from class 1 will have distance close to 0 to the first linear subspace and distance of at
least d to the second subspace. If we perturb x by a vector δ then the distance to each subspace can change by no more than
‖δ‖. This means that if ‖δ‖ < d/2, the distance to the first subspace will remain smaller than the distance to the second
subspace, and hence the Bayes-Optimal classifier will not be fooled by any perturbation whose norm is less than d/2. 
A.2. Robustness of the Optimal Classifier – Non Gaussian Distributions
A natural question following Lemma 1 is to what extent the result depends on the Gaussian distribution. To address this, we
now consider discrete distributions. We assume that every instance x is described by quantized features that can take on a
discrete number of values. For example, the features can be wavelet coefficients of an image that are discretized into 256
possible values. This means that p1(f), p2(f) are simply very large tables that give the probability of observing a particular
discrete set of image features given each of the classes. Of course learning such a large table is infeasible without additional
assumptions, but recall that we are analyzing the Bayes-Optimal case, where we assume p1(f), p2(f) are known.
Lemma A.1: Assume there exists a feature i and a quantization level k so that p1(fi = k)→ 1. Assume also that for any
feature vector f , p2(f) > 0. Then almost any point in class 1 is one quantization level away from the optimal decision
boundary.
3Two low-dimensional subspaces in high dimensions will almost always not intersect.
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Proof: We again write f = (s, t) where s is the ith feature and t are all other features.
p1(s, t) = p1(s)p1(t|s); (8)
Now since p1(s) approaches 1 for s = k and 0 otherwise, for almost any point in class 1 the value of that feature is equal to k.
We now change the feature by one quantization level and obtain a new feature vector (s˜, t) and p1(s˜, t) = p1(s˜)p1(t|s˜)→ 0.
On the other hand, by the assumption p2(s˜, t) > 0, so that this point would now be classified as belonging to class 2. 
As in the Gaussian case, we do not need p1(s) to be exactly equal to a delta function for the decision surface to be close to
most points. It is enough that p1(s˜) be much smaller than the minimal values of p2 for the decision to be flipped when we
replace s with s˜. Figures 3g,c illustrate this dependence. In both cases, the data is sampled from a discrete distribution where
the features are simply discretization of the two spatial coordinates into 100 levels each. In other words, p1 and p2 are tables
of size 10, 000 and each entry in the table represents the probability of generating a point at one of the 10, 000 possible
locations. In the top example, the minimal value of the probability table is approximately the same in both classes, while in
the bottom example, there is a strong asymmetry and the decision boundary becomes close to all points in one of the classes.
It is easy to see that Theorem 1 that discusses mixture distributions is applicable to the discrete case as well.
B. Models
In this section we provide additional information about the different classification models – architecture, hyper-parameters
and training procedure.
B.1. MFA
A Mixture of Factor Analyzers (MFA) (Ghahramani et al., 1996) is a Gaussian Mixture Model where each component is
a Factor Analyzer parameterized by a low rank plus diagonal covariance matrix. MFA provides a good tradeoff between
the non-expressive diagonal-covariance model and a full-covariance model, which is too computationally expensive for
high-dimensional data such as full images.
The model for a single Factor Analyzer component is:
x = Az + µ+ η , z ∼ N (0, I) , η ∼ N (0, D) , (9)
where A is the rectangular factor loading matrix, z is a low-dimensional latent factors vector, µ is the mean and η is the
added noise with a diagonal covariance D (which may be isotropic: D = σ2I) This results in the Gaussian distribution
x ∼ N (µ, AAT +D). The MFA is a mixture of such Gaussians.
The MFA model was trained using the code provided by Richardson & Weiss (2018). The models are trained using
Stochastic Gradient Descent. The training data (CelebA, MNIST) is first split by the desired binary attribute (e.g. Smiling
/ Not Smiling) and then a separate MFA model was trained independently for each subset of training samples. Because
of imbalance in the number of samples per class in CelebA, we set the number of components as the number of samples
divided by 1000. For MNIST we used a fixed value of 25 components per class. We chose an MFA latent dimension of 10
for CelebA and 6 for MNIST.
To allow attacking the MFA model with standard adversarial attacks such as CW-L2, we implemented it in TensorFlow as a
standard CleverHans (Papernot et al., 2016) model.
B.2. Bayes-Optimal
The MFA model is the Bayes-Optimal classifier when the data is sampled from that model. We modified the MFA models
that were trained for the different classes to define pairs of Bayes-optimal models – symmetric and asymmetric.
For the symmetric models, we simply fixed all noise variance values in D to a small value (σ = 0.01). To construct the
asymmetric models we added two outlier components (one for each class) that are equal to the dataset global mean plus
changes along a direction of low-variance: We performed PCA over the entire dataset and took the eigenvector for the 50th
largest eigenvalue as this direction, where the mean of one outlier is in the positive direction and the mean of the other in the
negative one. We set A = 0 and σ = 0.5 for both outliers, making them spherical gaussians around the two means with
relatively large noise compared to the other components. See figure 10 for the outlier component means for CelebA and for
MNIST.
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Figure 10. Outlier components means for CelebA (a) and for MNIST (b). Samples from these components are the shown means plus
strong isotropic noise with σ = 0.5.
B.3. CNN
We used the reference CNN implementation from the CleverHans library (Papernot et al., 2016), which is a benchmark
library for evaluating adversarial attacks and defences. The network consists of 2D convolution layers with a kernel size of 3
and Leaky ReLU activations. We used a stride of 2 in several equally-spaced layers along the depth of the network to reduce
the spatial dimension and at each such layer we doubled the width (number of channels). The network ends with a single
fully-connected layer. All other hyper-parameters were left at their default values and the optimization method was Adam.
Our baseline small CNN achieves 100% train and test accuracy on the symmetric datasets and we also experimented with
increasing both the depth and the width of the CNN by a large factor (see figure 8).
B.4. Linear SVM
We used the standard 2-class linear SVC implementation provided by sklearn/libsvm (Pedregosa et al., 2011). Linear SVM
is trained directly on the vectorized image samples. The learned model consists of a weight vector W and a scalar bias b.
The decision for a sample x is simply sign(WTx+ b).
B.5. RBF SVM
We used sklearn for the Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel SVM as well. Selection of two hyper-parameters is required,
the radial kernel coefficient γ = 12σ2 and C, a regularization term. We used the default C = 1.0 and the highest γ value that
still provided a high classification accuracy.
C. Attacks
C.1. CW-L2
The Carlini & Wagner L2 attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) is a recommended strong attack that minimizes the perturbation
L2 norm. The attack minimizes a weighted combination of a classification loss with the perturbation L2 size. The relative
weight is a parameter that is found using a binary-search. We used the CleverHans implementation with the following
hyper-parameters: 500 iterations, 3 binary-searches and a learning rate of 0.01.
C.2. Gradient Descent Attack
Since the MFA and SVM models provides a simple closed-form expression for the likelihood and its gradient, we
implemented a simple and fast version of a gradient-attack for these models. Our attack performs multiple fixed-size steps in
the direction of the gradient of the difference in log-likelihood between the source and target Gaussian components, until the
decision boundary is crossed. We repeated some of the experiments with the (much slower) CW-L2 attack and verified that
the results are similar (i.e. models that are shown to be robust to our gradient descent attack are also robust to the CW-L2
attack with similar perturbation magnitudes).
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Figure 11. Histogram of distances (`2) from samples from the Male/Female symmetric dataset to the nearest Gaussian subspace in the
other class. Results are consistent with the required adversarial perturbation magnitude.
D. Additional Results
In this section we provide additional experimental results for the different datasets, attributes and models.
D.1. Distance to the Decision Surface – Symmetric Datasets
According to Theorem 1 and Lemma 3, if the data can be represented as a mixture of low-rank plus diagonal Gaussians and
the off-manifold (diagonal) variances are all small and similar (no strong asymmetries), then the distance from a sample to
the optimal decision surface will be half the distance to the nearest component subspace in the other (target) class.
In toy distributions (e.g. figure 3d) we can control these distances arbitrarily, but what will the distances between subspaces
be in our symmetric datasets, which approximate the manifold of real image datasets? As can be seen in Figure 11 (for
Male/Female dataset), the distances to the nearest subspace in the other class are large – mean of 6.2). These values are
consistent with the mean adversarial perturbation sizes that were actually required to fool the Bayes-Optimal classifier (mean
`2 of 3 – half of the mean distance to the nearest component subspace). The same is true for the other symmetric datasets.
D.2. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric
Figure 12 presents additional examples comparing symmetric and asymmetric datasets and the relative robustness of their
Bayes-Optimal classifiers to adversarial examples.
D.3. Symmetric Datasets
Table 1 lists the clean and adversarial classification accuracy of all models for all symmetric datasets.
Figures 13-16 show original and adversarial samples and perturbations as well as histograms of the perturbations in pixel
values for all models in different symmetric datasets (the number at the top of each histogram is the mean perturbation L2
over all test samples).
D.4. Results on Real Data
D.4.1. TRAINING AND TESTING ON REAL DATA
As shown in figure 9, results on real data are consistent with our symmetric datasets results – CNN and Linear SVM learn
a vulnerable classifier while RBF SVM is robust. Table 2 lists the clean and adversarial accuracy values for the different
models trained on different real image datasets.
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Smiling/NotSmiling Asymmetric: (L2 = 0.8)
Smiling/NotSmiling Symmetric: (L2 = 3.1)
0/6 Asymmetric: (L2 = 0.5)
0/6 Symmetric: (L2 = 3.0)
Figure 12. The vulnerability of the optimal classifier depends on the presence of asymmetries. Each result shows the original images,
adversarial images and perturbations (magnified for visibility as necessary). In the symmetric datasets, attacking the optimal classifier
requires large and perceptually meanigfull perturbations.
Table 1. Clean and adversarial (in brackets) classification accuracy values for different models for the symmetric datasets.
Dataset / Attribute Bayes-Optimal CNN Linear SVM RBF SVM
CelebA / Bangs 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 96% (18%)
CelebA / Black Hair 100% (0%) 98% (2%) 100% (0%) 96% (26%)
CelebA / Brown Hair 100% (0%) 99% (1%) 100% (0%) 86% (16%)
CelebA / Heavy Makeup 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 96% (14%)
CelebA / High Cheekbones 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 96% (10%)
CelebA / Male 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (8%)
CelebA / Mouth Slightly Open 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 94% (8%)
CelebA / No Beard 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 94% (10%)
CelebA / Smiling 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 96% (10%)
CelebA / Wearing Earrings 100% (0%) 99% (1%) 100% (0%) 94% (16%)
CelebA / Wearing Lipstick 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 92% (18%)
CelebA / Eyeglasses 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (22%)
MNIST / 06 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (4%)
MNIST / 27 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (7%)
MNIST / 45 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (0%) 100% (8%)
Table 2. Clean and adversarial (in brackets) classification accuracy values for different models for real CelebA data.
Dataset / Attribute CNN Linear SVM RBF SVM
CelebA / Male 94.7% (5.30%) 89.7% (10.3%) 89.7% (11.3%)
CelebA / Smiling 88.0% (12.0%) 88.3% (11.7%) 84.3% (16.3%)
CelebA / Bangs 94.0% (6.00%) 87.0% (13.0%) 93.7% (24.7%)
CelebA / Heavy Makeup 86.0% (14.0%) 83.7% (16.3%) 85.7% (20.7%)
CelebA / Eyeglasses 100.% (0.00%) 93.7% (6.33%) 96.3% (32.3%)
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Table 3. Real test images classification accuracy for CNNs trained on real training data vs CNNs trained on samples from the symmetric
dataset.
Dataset / Attribute Real Train Data Symmetric Train Data
CelebA / Male 92.3% 88.0%
CelebA / Smiling 89.5% 85.6%
CelebA / Bangs 94.3% 90.4%
CelebA / Heavy Makeup 86.3% 79.9%
CelebA / Eyeglasses 98.4% 91.7%
D.4.2. TRAINING ON SYMMETRIC DATA AND TESTING ON REAL DATA
To estimate how close our symmetric datasets are to the real datasets, we tested the CNNs that were trained on the symmetric
dataset on real test samples and compared the test accuracy to that of CNNs that were trained on the real training data. As
can be seen in Table 3, there is an average accuracy reduction of just 5%, indicating that the symmetric datasets are not that
far from the original data.
Orig
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3.89
CNN 0 16 32 48 64
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Lin. SVM 0 16 32 48 64
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RBF SVM 0 16 32 48 64
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Figure 13. Samples, perturbations and histograms for CelebA attribute ’Eyeglasses’
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Figure 14. Samples, perturbations and histograms for CelebA attribute ’No Beard’
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Figure 15. Samples, perturbations and histograms for MNIST digits 0 vs. 6
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Figure 16. Samples, perturbations and histograms for MNIST digits 4 vs. 5
